FEDERALISM: A RECIPE FOR DISINTEGRATED AFGHANISTAN?

Abstract

Federalism is a much-disputed concept in Afghanistan. While the advocates of Federalism see it as the only way out of the ethnic and the only form of government within which minority are protected and individual liberties are preserved, the opponents of Federalism fear a total disintegration of the country and warlordism. This article is an attempt to see if those fears and favours are justified and if Federalism is a remedy for divided and diversified Afghanistan.

By: Ofran Badakhshani

Table of Contents

Introduction

After the tragic events of 9/11 Afghanistan once again become the canter of international and particularly American focus. By then the Afghan state had gone through many ideological transformations, from kingdom to Republic, to communism, to Islamism and finally radical Islamism during the reign of the Taliban. In more than one century, efforts to build a sustainable state with a strong centralized power led to the factual fragmentation of Afghanistan after the fall of communism. Scholar like Barfield (2010), Hyman (2002), Rubin (2002) Gregorian (1969), believe that along with the deeply-rooted feudal structure and tribal culture, ethnic diversity and cultural plurality have led to the failure of both state and nation building in Afghanistan.

After the invasion of the United States of America in 2001, within three years the Council of elders ratified a new constitution, making Afghanistan an Islamic state with a strong president. Although, before the installation of the interim government after the first Bonn conference in 2001 and before ratification of the new Afghan constitution, both Afghan statesmen and international community knew how fragmented Afghanistan was, they chose for the presidential form of government. This political choice opened a new chapter in the political struggle for dominance and superiority claims in ethnically diversified Afghanistan.

Just like newly independent countries that after the Second World War copied the basic constitutional rules of their former colonial masters, Afghanistan too copied a presidential form of government which according to Lijphart (2004) and Linz (1994) are doomed to fail in divided countries like Afghanistan. And since the establishment of a democratic government, at least, requires power sharing and group autonomy, this essay, the one hand, seeks out if federalism is the right form of government for Afghanistan and on the other, presents a set of recommendations focusing on constitutional need for countries with deep ethnic divisions. Therefore, the main question of this essay will be, will federalism work for Afghanistan?

The paper is divided into five parts. In the first part the idea and origins of Federalism will be discussed, answering the question: what is federalism? The second part will be a justification of the idea, providing reasons for federalism. The third part will give a brief overview of recent state building and politico-social structure of Afghanistan. In the fourth, based on the discussion in the previous sections of the paper, I will elaborate on the current discussions of the advocates and opponents of

federalism in Afghanistan. Consequently, in the conclusion the main question of the paper will be answered.

Part 1: Federalism: concepts, meanings and conditions

In what follows I will firstly give a brief overview of federalism in the Western thought and consequently answer the following questions: what is federalism and what are its defining characteristics? What are the specific advantageous and disadvantageous of federalism? What are the main subtypes of federalism?

A brief historical overview of the federal thought

The federal thought is older than the emergence of the first centralized states in early 17th and 18th century. According to Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Johannes Althusius (1557-1630) is believed to be the founding father of federalism. This is not merely because he in his best-known work *Politica Methodice Digesta*, argued for the autonomy of his city Emden, but also because he, under the influence of French Huguenots[1] and orthodox Calvinists who introduced "a doctrine of resistance as the right and duty of natural leaders to resist tyranny; developed a non-sectarian, non-religious contractualist political theory of federation that prohibited state intervention even for the purpose of promoting the right faith" (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2003). From then onward political thinkers have explored what we now regard as federal political order. In what follows I will give a very brief overview of those who greatly contributed to the development of the federal thought.

Scholars like Elazar (1998) believe that Ludolph Hugo "was the first to distinguish confederations based on alliance and decentralized unitary states" (Elazar quoted in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2003). Consequently, in the Spirit of Laws, Charles de Secondat and Baron de Montesquieu pleaded for a "confederal arrangement to combine the best of the small and large political communities" (Ibid). The aim was to on the one hand secure the small political units against the abuse of power by large units and each other and on the other hand to secure the benefit of the larger political units.

David Hume (1711-1776) disagreed with Montesquieu and instead of small political unities he argued for larger political units where democracy can be refined.

---

[1] The Huguenots were members of the Protestant Reformed Church of France during the 16th and 17th centuries.

He believed that geographically large systems would be better in preventing decisions based on intrigue, prejudice or passion against the public interest.

According to Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2010), in the 18th century several peace plans for Europe recommended a confederal arrangement. The 1713 Peace Plan of Abbe Charles de Saint-Pierre is one of those, which allowed intervention in member units to subdue rebellion and war on non-members in order to force them to join the established confederation.

In his perpetual peace, Immanuel Kant (1724-1808) defended a confederation, arguing that instead of a peace treaty the right of nations should be based on a specific federation among free states. "This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to public laws and to coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature" (Kant, 1970).

But it's the debate around the U.S Constitutional Convention of 1787 that marks a clear development in federal thought. According to Burgess (2006) the American federal tradition has its philosophical roots in the emergence of social contract theory[2] in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and France. Burgess argues that three principals formed the basis for a distinct federal tradition. These are, "..., the covenantal tradition, British and American federal ideas and experience and the Federalist papers" (Burgess 2006: 177).

In what we know as *The Federalist Papers*, Madison, Hamilton and Jay, argued for federal arrangements. Madison and Hamilton followed Hume's logic, arguing that bigger republics will reduce the risk tyranny by majority. "A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any improper or wicked project, will be less likely to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it" (Federalist 10). In fact, The Federalists argued for the dividing of sovereignty between member units and the centre. This, they believed, will not only reduce the risk of tyranny by majority but also protect individual rights

---

[2] In political philosophy the social contract is a model originating during the Age of Enlightenment, that addresses the questions of the origin of society and the legitimacy of the authority of the state over the individual. Hugo Grotius (1625), Thomas Hobbes (1651), John Locke (1689), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) and Immanuel Kant (1797) are among the most prominent of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theorists of social contract and natural rights.

against abuse by authorities at either level.

Towards the end of 19th century, with J. S. Mill and P. J. Proudhon, federalism was no longer a political instrument to solve inter-state conflicts only. By then, federalism was used to preserve individual liberties within traditional communities, who entered pacts among themselves for essential purposes.

Meanwhile to two other historical events strengthened new philosophical reflections on federalism. The first was the devolution of colonial powers, which forced multi-ethnic societies to seek for other alternatives to centralized authorities in case of India for example, which will be discussed in other parts of this paper. The second was the Second World War which was mainly by nationalism.

With this very brief overview of the federal thought in the Western political history, I now turn to the recent debates and philosophical discussions concerning federalism. The contemporary debates include; reasons for federalism, the source of stability and instability, legitimate division of powers between the units, distributive justice and the politics of recognition and redistributions. Due to limited space I will not be able to discuss all of them. In regard to main question of this paper I am mainly interested in reasons for federalism. But first; what is federalism?

Federalism, Federation and Confederation

What is federalism and what are its defining characteristics? Federalism remains a contested notion and hard to define. Ontologically, the name federation is derived from Latin word *foedus* meaning pact, alliance entered into voluntarily a certain mutual trust (Søren Dosenrode 2010). In addition, any attempt to define federalism emphasises the division of power between at least two levels of government. According to Wheare a federal government is "as association of states so organized that powers are divided between a general government, which in certain matters for example, the making of treaties and the coining of money is independent of the government of the associated states, and on the other hand, state governments, which in certain matters are, in their turn, independent of the general government. This involves, as a necessary consequence, that general and regional governments both operate directly upon the people; each citizen is subject to two governments" (1963: 2).

William Riker's definition of a federal government focuses on the territorial division of power by referring to "a government of the federation and a set of

government rule over the same territory and people and each kind has the authority to make some decisions indecently of the other" (Riker 1964: 5). In contrast to this Daniel Elazar associate's federalism with the "prevalence of a covenant of partnership between the general government and its sub-units" (Elazar 1979a: 4).

While many scholars focused only the institutional propensity of federalism, Preston King (1982: 21) made a distinction between the institutional and the ideological aspects of federalism. According to King ideological federalism reflects upon at least three different orientations; "centralist, decentralist and balance" (Ibid). The centralist view of federalism reflects upon both national and international level of governance. Internationally, it refers to the long-standing view that by restraining the war making capability of state through supra national structures, peace could be maintained. At the national level, he argues, it was through centralization that independent states formed federations (King 1982: 21-25). The decentralist view of federalism, on the one hand reflects upon the instrumental use of federalism to subdue the growth and the concentration of political power and on the other it could be an expression of particularity, individualism and democracy (Ibid 43). Thirdly, according to King, federalism is conceived as a balance between autonomy and independence, and unity and diversity (King 1982: 43-44).

While Elazar (1979) defines federalism as a political organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule, Burgess stresses both the ideological and the philosophical aspect of federalism as; "overtly prescriptive guide to action" and as "a normative judgment upon the ideal organization of human relations and conduct" (Burgess 2000: 27).

Scholars also agree that federalism refers to a category of political organisation encompassing a variety of species, including federations, confederacies, union and leagues and attempts to analyse and explain how they emerged and how they function. What are these political entities and how are they defined and how do they differ?

A federation according to Watts (1998) involves a territorial division of power between constituent units, also called provinces in a common government. This power division is embedded in the constitution that forbids both the member unit and the common government to alter it unitarily. According to Federalist Papers, within this political organization, both the member unit and the common government are of effect on the individual citizens. The authorities of both member unit and common

government are directly elected. For King federation "is a descriptive term referring to a particular type of institutional relationship" (cited in Watts 1998: 119). In addition to its territorial definition a federation according to Watts is also "A compound polity combining constituent units and a general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a significant portion of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers, and each directly elected by its citizens" (Ibid 121).

King defines a federation as "an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis" (King 1982: 20).

In contrast to a federation, a confederation is a political order with some weaker centre. What really distinguishes a confederation from a federation, according to Burgess (2006), is that, the member units of a confederation may legally exit. The centre only exercises authority delegated by the member units. The centre is subject to member unit's veto on many issues. Centre decisions bind member units only and not directly the individual citizens. The centre lacks an independent electoral base. The member units do not authority permanently to the centre.

In other words, confederations are often the outcome of certain agreements to execute certain task. Within a confederation the delegates of member units could exercise the common government. The current European Union, could, to some degree, be seen as a confederation. Watts describes confederations as a "species of federal system in which the institutions of shared rule from the constituent governments; being composed of delegates from the constituent governments and therefore having only an indirect electoral and fiscal base" (Watts 1998: 121). A distinction is also made between symmetrical and asymmetrical confederations. The symmetrical confederations are understood to have the same share of power, while within asymmetrical confederation, such as Canada, European Union or India the member units may have a different bundle of power.

Having defined federalism, federation and confederation, let us reflect upon the origins of federation; how did federations emerge? In order to answer this question, it's important to broadly distinguish two schools of federal theory. Analogously to the theories of International Relations these schools could be

categorized as the *Liberal school of Federalism* and the *Realist school of Federalism* (Dosenrode 2010). The first, mostly associated with Burgess, Spinelli and Wheare, states that federations are formed upon mutual consensus and on the voluntary basis. This school draws upon the voluntary desire of state to be united. Consequently, is argued that in the heart of this desire lies the need for common defence force, the hope for economic benefit from the union, independence from foreign powers and the realization that only through unity independence is secured.

The realist school of federalism, which is mainly associated with David McKay and W. H. Riker, states that federalism is just another way to solve the problem of enlarging governments. In Riker's terms; "each advance in the technology of transportation makes it possible to rule a larger geographic area from one centre, to fill a treasury more abundantly, to maintain larger bureaucracy and police, and, most important of all, to assemble a larger army. (...). And, once one government enlarges itself, then its neighbours and competitors feel compelled to do likewise in order, supposedly, to forestall anticipated aggression (Riker 1964: 2).

According to Riker this expansionist and military condition is necessary for the occurrence and formation of federations. He furthermore argues that even when federations are formed based on political bargain; it's either for the sake of territorial expansion or for the sake of independence from some external military or diplomatic threat (Riker 1964: 14).

In sum, federalism is the theory of a set of principles for dividing powers between member units and common institutions. Within a federal order the political power is not centralized, but constitutionally divided between two or more units. Furthermore, the units can have the final authority and can be self-governing over some issue. Within a federal order citizen have political obligations to and two authorities secure their rights. Last but not least, federation, confederation, leagues and union are the defining characteristics of federalism.

Part 2: Reasons, conditions and motives for federalism:
In this part I'll answer the following questions; what reasons are there for preferring a federal order to a unitary state? Under what conditions does federalism come about? Could federalism server as a means to manage ethnic conflict?

Reasons for federalism
According to Goodin (1996), Watts (1999) and Federalist Papers, through

constitutional allocation of power to member units, federal arrangements protect individuals and minorities against central authorities. The European federalists like Spinelli, Rossi (1941) argued that federations foster peace by preventing interstate wars. They believed that by joining confederations, jointly, state become powerful enough to deter external threats and prevent aggressive wars between themselves. Others believe that by removing internal barriers to trade and by establishing inter-member trade agreements, federations can better promote economic prosperity (Keohane and Nye, 2001). A closer look at the current European Union too shows that federations promote cooperation, justice and other values among and within the member units by monitoring, legislations, enforcement of agreements and human rights. Scholars (Elazar 1968; Lijphart 1999) also argue that within a federal order citizen are more likely to participate in public decision making through deliberation and offices in both the member units and central bodies. They also believe that federal arrangements shelter territorially based groups with deferring preferences from the majority of the population. In other words, federal orders may minimize coercion and be responsive to a great number of citizens with divergent political preferences.

Briefly, federal orders promote individual liberties, shelter political minorities, foster peace and cooperation and therefore prevent inter-state wars and stimulate economic prosperity.

Conditions and motives for federalism

According to Burgess (2006) the debate about the origins and formation of federations is closely associated with Riker's analysis to identify conditions under which federations are created. The conditions that formed the basis of Riker's hypothesis were:

1. A desire on the part of the politicians who offer the bargain to expand their territorial control by peaceful means, usually either to meet and external military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression or aggrandizement.
2. A willingness on the part of politicians who accept the bargain to give up some independence for the sake of union either because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. Either the desire protection from an external threat or they desire to participate in the potential aggression of the federation (Riker, 1964: 14).

Put differently, these expansionist and military conditions were according to Riker necessary for the occurrence of federations. Antony Birch reviewed Riker's propositions and added two more conditions to the hypothesis. These were; "the desire to deter internal threats and the willingness to have them deterred" (Burgess, 2006: 77-81). In sum, whereas Riker mainly focuses on the external threats and opportunities, Birch reflects upon the internal circumstances, which lead to the formation of federations. Are these conditions sufficient for the federations to come about? In order to answer this question, let us look at the historical events and developments that led to the formation of Switzerland, India and Malaysia.

Switzerland

Switzerland became a federation in 1848. But according to Burgess (2006) its federal roots go back to 1291 when the Alpine communities of Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden entered into a league of mutual defence against the house of Habsburg. Burgess also believes that in addition to this external factor, the evolution of Swiss federation includes a combination of noticeable American influences, unique admixture of political institutions, a political culture rooted in reciprocity, tolerance, mutual understanding, recognition of minorities and compromise and consent above majoritarian calculations.

Scholars (Wolf Linder and Burgess, 2006) have agreed upon three factors that led to the formation of the Swiss federations; economic factors, external pressure and a combination of democratization with the federal idea. They argue that between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Switzerland had suffered of four religious wars and by the mid nineteenth century, industrialization had reached many cantons, creating new urban classes with stake in removing cantonal boundaries and obstacles to economic activities. The environment persuaded the cantons to initiate decisive steps towards the federation in order to safeguard their economic interest and to buttress their collective security. Finally, according to Burgess (2006) by then the Swiss people were familiarized with individual responsibility, different forms of communalism and collective decision-making. The implication of this political consciousness meant power sharing between multi lingual collections of communities.

This brief overview of Swiss federal experience shows that there are more factors involved in occurrence of federation than suggested by Riker. Therefore, in addition to the external factors, economic interest of different cantons,

democratization a political culture rooted in reciprocity, tolerance, mutual understanding, recognition of minorities and compromise have been of great importance for the occurrence of the Swiss federation.

India

The formation of the Indian federation in 1950 had its roots in the following ambiguities:

1. The division of ideas among the political elites about nation unity and domestic stability, the protection of minorities and the political influence of Great Britain.
2. The partition of India in August 1947 and therefore establishment of Pakistan.
3. The dominant position of the Congress Party representing the Hindu population and the predisposing of political elites and their emphasis on a strong federal centre at the cost an organic state unit (Burgess, 2006).

In contrast to Riker's expansionist and military conditions, one of the underlying factors for the formation of the Indian federation is what Bidyut Chakrabarty has called the 'unpacking of empires' which refers to the devolution of the British imperial power in India (Burgess, 2006: 81-97). The British sought to bring together within one constitutional system, parts of India under indirect rule and to deal with the communal rights and status between Hindus and Muslims to overcome Muslim anxiety? The colonial patterns of centralization in combination with the thinking of the Indian political leadership led to partition of India and the emergence of Pakistan in 1947. It was mainly this experience that demonstrated the inherent dangers of separatism and predisposed the architects of the Indian constitution to favour a centralized federal formula.

Malaysia

The origins of the modern federation of Malaysia can be traced back to early 1895 when federated Malaya States, Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan was formed by the British colonial administration (Burgess, 2006: 81-97). The new federation was created in 1948. The interesting feature of the Malaysian federation according to Burgess (Ibid) is the notion of non-territorial federation. Commentators have called it a 'racial federation' because the identifying diversities of Malaysia were not territorially grouped.

None of the three largest communities, the Malays, also known as the Bumiputars (sons of the soil) who form 58% of the total population, the Chinese 24%, and the Indian descents who form up to 8% of Malaysian population could make territorial claims because they almost equally populated different states (Burgess, 2006; Encyclopaedia of the Nations 2013). But the patterns of the feasible predominance of the two largest ethnic groups paved the way for a political situation that favoured a federal over a unitary system.

In sum, two things can be said about the motives for enlarging and adapting an already existing federal union in Malaysia. First, it confirms the prominent role of diplomatic and strategic considerations. Second, it was the communal interactions, ethnic, territorial and economic diversities that produced favourable circumstances to rescue Malaysia from the Chinese economic dominance.

Having discussed the general condition under which federalism occurs and the reasons and motives for the adoption of federal arrangements, now I turn to the role of federalism in conflict management.

Federalism and conflict management

This part deals with the following questions; what is ethnic conflict? What does ethnic conflict management mean? Could federalism serve as a means to manage ethnic conflict?

The contemporary political discourse in multi-ethnic societies is dominated by ethnicity and ethnic conflict (Boal, 2001). Although scholars argue that ethnicity is a recent construction, some of its key elements such as language, kinship and culture remain old concepts that kept the minds of groups busy through the human history. Therefore, ethnicity "may mean the essence of an ethnic group" and "the quality of belonging to an ethnic community" (Hutchison and Smith 1996: 3). Hence, in defining ethnicity or an ethnic group, the emphasis is put on those factors that differentiate one group from another and brace cohesion within and between group members. A. D. Smith for example defines an ethnic group as "a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity among at least some of its members" (Smith, 1995a: 56-57). Based on this, one could define ethnic conflict as one where "the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in, (…), ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of

ethnic distinction" (Wolff, 2006: 2).

Ethnic conflict management on the hand is about reducing political tension between different ethnic groups (Horowitz, 1991: 116). Thus, policies and institutions of conflict management do not seek to resolve ethnic conflict but rather to manage it. Ethnic conflict management "refers to the capacity of political institutions to contain ethnic conflict within their mechanism, routines, and procedures for resolution" (Cohen, 1997: 608). The view to recognize cultural and ethnic pluralism in multi-ethnic societies is rather a recent one. According to Kymlicka (2001), states in the past have mainly aimed at ethnic homogenization and sometimes through instruments that ranged from physical extermination to coercive assimilation.

In regard to regulation of ethnic diversity, scholars such as John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (1993), divide ethnic policies of the multi-ethnic states into two categories of elimination and managing diversities. Within their division, instruments of elimination include, genocide, forced mass population transfers, secession and assimilation. The instruments of management include, hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation[3], federalism, and consociationalism[4]. Smooha (2002) argues that many countries in the world have sought to resolve the question of ethnic diversity through assimilative means. In general, Smooha stresses that assimilationist policies impose a single language and culture, deny collective group rights and deprive ethnic groups from institutional mechanisms for separate existence (Smooha, 2002: 423-424). In the case of Afghanistan, as later will be demonstrated, this was the imposition of Pashtu language on other ethnic groups and structural Pashtunization of the country.

However, scholars argue that assimilating ethics groups into a "homogenous nation is not a practical approach" (Lijphart, 1991: 493). Kymlicka (1995), goes even further saying that key liberal values like individual freedom is tied to membership in culture and language and therefore, liberal democracies are required to respect minority rights. Hence, in regard to ethnic diversity, assimilative policies are increasingly challenged for their deficit of social justice.

But could federalism serve as a means to manage ethnic conflict? Those who back the so-called multi-ethnic federalism, argue that, "federalism helps to manage inter-group conflicts that might otherwise escalate into violence and lead to

---

[3] Cantonisation refers to a movement that aims to divide 'nation-state' into almost independent cantons.
[4] Consociationalism is a form of government involving guaranteed group representation, often suggested for managing conflict in deeply divided societies. It's also associated with corporatism.

proliferation of mini-states without much viability" (Agnew, 1995: 396). In a similar argument, Lake and Rothchild stress, "by enabling local and regional authorities to wield a degree of autonomous power, elites at the political centre can promote confidence among local leader" and therefore, federalism can play a vital role in managing political conflict (Lake and Rothchild, 1998a: 117). Others, Ostrom (1979), O'Leary (2001) state that no other political structure provides a better solution for multi-ethnic countries than federalism.

In addition, it's believed that through federal arrangements, self-governing democracies can be created within which minorities could feel secure and identify themselves the multi-ethnic state in which they live (Kalin 2000: 3). Taken federalism's contribution to preservation of minorities, it is also considered as a useful means for the pacification of ethnic tensions (Smith, 1995b: 19). In this sense, the restructuring of Indian federal arrangements along territorial and lingual lines could serve as a good example, which is considered as an important decision that helped India from foundering (Duchacek, 1970: 279).

There are also arguments against the use of federalism as an instrument of ethnic conflict management. The argument here is that, within an ethnically diversified society, it is impossible to make congruent ethnic and administrative boundaries. But as discussed in the case of Malaysia earlier, it shows that even within an ethnically diversified society like that Malaysia; federalism can hold ground and contribute to social justice and economic prosperity.

Part 3: Afghanistan:
Afghanistan has a very diversified ethnic composition. Over 53 ethnic groups populate the country. Among these there are four ethnic groups that have come to shape the political landscape of Afghanistan. The Afghans or the Pashtuns are believed to be the largest ethnic group and according estimations of Encyclopaedia of the Nations (2011), they form 38% of the total population. Tajiks or Persians are the second largest group and form 25% followed by the Persian speaking Hazaras who form 19% of the total population. Uzbeks form 6% and other 12% consists of different ethnic and religious minorities.

Social and political structure
Most scholars agree on two facts. One, "all nation states have citizens who share at least a juridical nationality" and two Afghanistan is a tribal society and therefore, far

from being called a nation state (Rubin, 1975: 6-25). As Rubin (1995) further argues, for the inhabitants of Afghanistan kinship has been the essential means of political and economic mobilization. The tribal structure of Afghanistan becomes even more obvious when one focuses on the forms of political representation. Regimes in Afghanistan from old to contemporary have recognized and used certain tribal institutions as a means to control the inhabitants of Afghanistan, particularly in the case of the rural areas. The government officials and local administrations in the rural areas interact "with the population indirectly, through officially appointed representative (called *malik* or *arbab*[5]) of units called *Qaum*" (Rubin, 1995: 25).

The important term here is the word Qaum. Qaum is often translated as tribe or clan, but it also refers to different forms of solidarity. In some cases, Qaum even has come to mean ethnic group, for example when the inhabitants of Afghanistan say, Qaum-e-Tajik, they mean the Tajik ethnic group. But also "for those who carried identity cards under the old regime, (…), the line marked qaum contained an ethno-linguistic designation (Tajik, Pashtun, Uzbek)" (Rubin, 1997: 25).

The lack of an encompassing national identity is another obvious reason to term Afghanistan as a tribal society. As put forward by Rubin (1995) even that percentage of ethnic groups living an urban life carry an identity card by which they are identified to which Qaum or ethnic group they belong to. Even today after many efforts to build a state with a central authority and a nation with shared values and norms, what has become to be known, as the Afghan passport does not contain a line for nationality (till 2007). If it was not for the title of the passport itself saying, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the holder of that passport could not have been identified as an inhabitant of Afghanistan.

Also the role of the government in the formation of a national identity and well-established state remains somewhat fluid. The royal government for example "tried to break large units into smaller ones; among nontribal peoples it tried to reinforce limited kinship or residence-based political identities. Such patterns are typical of a weak state attempting to retain its power by weakening society through fragmentation" (Rubin, 1997: 25). The fragmentation of society by the government goes even further. Language, religion and descent were the elements by which

---

[5] Malik means possessor, he who possesses ground is often called the malik of ground, or the owner. Arbab generally refers to the head of a Qaum, he who represent the Qaum in social and political matters.

observers including the government defined the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The problem however, is as Rubin (1997) rightly argues, no region of Afghanistan is ethnically uniform and no tribe is dominant.

Accordingly in the mid-1950s the state structure itself created recognizable patterns of tribal-ethnic stratification within the political arena of Afghanistan. From the 1950s to 1978 the head of state (King until 1973 and president from 1973-1978), "was a member of the Muhammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe of the Durrani, one of the three major groups of Pashtun tribes" (Rubin, 1997: 26). During this era the Muhammadzais dominated the social hierarchy. Bellow them were the other Durrani clans and then came the rest of the Pashtun belonging to other tribes as, Ghilzis who were again divided into other sub-tribes as Hotaki, Suleiman-Khel, Tokhi and so on. After the Pashtuns came the Persian speaking peoples which included Tajiks and Hazaras and Uzbeks. In other words, the state was not only tribally organized but also tribally defined. Even the nontribal peoples as Tajiks and Hazaras could not escape the tribal structure of the state dominated by the Pashtun tribes.

Recent state Building

The efforts of Abdul Rahman (1880-1901) and his successor Amir Habibullah (1901-1919) as well as that of other regimes to build an Afghan state with a central and strong authority, ended in a political nightmare. Abdul Rahman's effort to unify Afghanistan and to break down the local and tribal authorities had very harsh consequence for the autonomous and the non-Afghan population of Afghanistan. In breaking down the Hazara autonomy in the central of present-day Afghanistan, according to Rasanayagam (2005), the Amir, through massacres, serfdom, expulsion and resettlement reduced the Hazara population to a fifth of the former size. Nooristan, Badakhshan and other parts were not exception to this policy.

Dupree (2002) states that from the beginning of the twentieth century there have been many attempts to foster unity through nation building activities, but the Afghans still uphold their traditional values and custom to distinguish themselves from one another. He further states that the last attempt to cast Afghans in an Islamic mould, met with disaster. Goodson (2001) too believes that any examination of the recent history of Afghanistan shows how on-going ethnic, religious and social divisions have occurred during 24 years of conflict and economic upheaval. Shahrani (2002) argues that different efforts of Afghan statesmen failed to unify Afghans under

one identity and that the ethnic factionalism prevented Afghanistan from become a strong state. Lack or failure of state building becomes even more evident in what follows.

In contrast to other scholars Barfield (2010) argues that the belief that Afghanistan was an artificial creation and doomed to collapse was rooted in confusion between the effectiveness of its institutions and the cohesion of its people. He believes that in 2001 when United States invaded Afghanistan, Afghanistan was not a failed state but a failed nation. His argument is based on the unity of different ethnic groups against the Russian aggression. Rasanayagam (2005), Rubin (1995) and Manochehr (2007) argue that in years of resistance against the Soviet Union, the oppressed ethnic groups sought for opportunities to rise and claim their identity again. Among the others Hazaras of Hazarajat were the first to wage a war against the communist regime of PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan). The Khans of the villages led the resistance against the PDPA, and by 1979 except for the capital Bamiyan, they liberated the province from communist rule and remained autonomous for the best part of the two coming decades[6]. The political nightmare mentioned earlier was the total fragmentation of Afghanistan along ethnic and regional lines.

This fragmentation was a consequence of two things, firstly the problem that President Najibullah was facing after the departure of Soviets to secure the vital supply routes from the north to the capital, and secondly the interest of Pakistan to keep Afghanistan divided. Rasanayagam (2005) argues that most of the Soviet forces were concentrated along the important routes, like the Salang tunnel, which was of great strategic importance, after their departure Najibullah lacked adequate forces to defend these areas. Therefore, he patronized local authorities and warlords to become a fighting force against the mujahedeen. Naderi, was one of these local authorities backed by PDPA who by 1989 had 13,000 trained troops and acted as intermediary in distributing Soviet aid and a channel of communication between communist regime and the mujahedeen. The Uzbek, General Adbul Rashid Dostum, led another effective pro-government militia, who originally safeguarded the natural gas company's installation in north. His earliest recruits were the oppressed Uzbeks of Juzjan province, who had been exploited by the monarch supported Durrani-Afghan

---

[6] See Rasanayagam (2005) p. 130 – 132.

landlords. His political movement became to be known as Jenbesh (movement in Persian) and by 1989 he had an army of 40,000 armed and well-trained men. "Their main task was to replace the Soviet troops protecting the gas fields and the supply routes from the Soviet border and southwards through Mazar-i-Sharif" (Rasanayagam, 2005: 130). There are many other examples of Najibullah's defence policy that later led to formation of strong and regional warlords and authorities.

Secondly, President Zia's policy with a long-term Pakistani interest played a vital role in the fragmentation of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. His problem was the mutual desire of Pashtuns in both Afghanistan and Pakistan for a greater Pashtunistan. For this reason, the earlier attempts of Afghan nationalist in Pakistan to form a unified command though which weapons and cash could easily be channelled to fight the jihad, was discouraged by Zia. Instead he chose to distribute to the resources separately to the seven hostile parties based in Peshawar. As a consequence of this policy, the seven parties had been operating independently and "had never been able to agree on a common political platform for the exercise of power in a post-communist Islamic republic" of Afghanistan (Rasanayagam, 2005: 135). In other words, the mujahedeen had a common enemy but a common future had never been subject of discussion.

Once the Soviet troops left, the communist regime fail and Afghanistan fell into the hands of mujahedeen Afghanistan turned into chaos. The tribal structure of the state and its organizational character along ethnic lines becomes once again clear in the transitional period. When the political settlement talks between USA and Soviet Union started, the foreign aid to Afghanistan was too ended. As a consequence, Najibullah could no longer buy the loyalty of his created militia in north and west. According to Rubin (1995) he turned to the only remaining tool of Afghan rulers, "manipulations of social segmentation" (Rubin, 1995: 269). He tried to assert control north, where Adbul Rashid Dostum his created militia had become a strong challenge for his government, by using the Pashtun solidarity method. Najibullah instructed General Juma Asak, a Pashtun who was known for his Pashtun chauvinist views and the commander of the Northern Zone, to replace General Mumin, the Tajik command of the Hairatan garrison where the weapons where strode. General Mumin not only refuses to obey the presidential order, but establish ties with both Dostum and Massoud.

As a consequence the Najibullah administration sought to find a "Pashtun

solutions" (Rubin, 1995: 271). The Pashtuns in Afghan military force, mainly Khaliqis[7], arranged the infiltration so unarmed fighters of Hizb-i-Islami of Hekmatyar, into the city, where they got arms from their co-ethnics in the Interior Ministry. But the pro-Masoud branch of PDPA had already seized control over bigger parts of the capital including the airport where Najibullah was prevented from leaving the country. In between Masoud in alliance with Dostum and General Mumin had seized control over all military bases of North and strategic routes and post from Mazar-i-Sharif to Kabul and on April 25th their forces were in control of Kabul.

Commander Masoud of the Jamiat was aware the fact that no single group could govern the fragmented country and therefore, he urgently called for the Peshawar arrangement and talks on power sharing. According to Rasanayagam on April 24th, according to Rubin on April 26 and according to Afghan scholars on April 27 an agreement was reached and became to be known as the Peshawar Agreement[8]. The agreement soon became inoperative because Hekmatyar commander of Hizb-i-Islami refused to sign it. He argued that his position as prime minister "should not be subordinate to that of the president, and the position defence minister (to which Masoud was appointed) should fall under the control of the prime minister" (Rasanayagam, 2005: 142). He was also against the inclusion of General Dostum, the Uzbek commander who had had served communists, and overlooked his own alliance the former communist minister of defence, Shahnawaz Tani.

The interim government for a term of two months by Mujadidi and a term four months by Rabbani, arrived in Kabul on April 28 to proclaim the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. But as Rubin correctly argues, "perhaps this entity was Islamic, hut it was hardly a state and certainly did not rule Afghanistan" (Rubin, 1995: 272).

The disagreement of Hekmatyar to sign the agreement was a growing issue and a great threat for political stability. The long-standing rivalry between Masoud and Hekmatyar and therefore, between Jamiat-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Islami became to be associated with the rivalries of Khalq and Parcham, the non-Pashtun and Pashtun, branch of DPPA and the endeavour to dominate political arena in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar claimed that the new government was a genuine mujahedeen government

---

[7] See Rubin (1995), p. 269 – 271.
[8] See Rasanayagam (2005), p. 141 – 142 and Rubin (1995), p. 271.

and consequently intensified his fights on Kabul, that had begun before the agreement was reached in Peshawar, and that gave birth to a destructive civil war. As a consequence of this civil war, Afghanistan divided into seven regional power centres. The most important ones will be discussed accordingly.

The North

As mentioned earlier, Abdul Rashid Dostum had already an army of 40,000 men. By the summer 1993, Dostum had integrated Uzbeks from different parts of country and had an armed force of 120,000 men. Because of his control over airfields, main roads and fuel depots, he was able to offer salaries and carrier prospects to even Pashtun officers of the former regime who had fled to north. Soon mujahedeen commanders of different parties too joined his Jenbesh. At that time, Balkh (Mazar-i-Sharif) was the only stable region of Afghanistan. Dostum succeeded in both keeping the formal functioning structures intact and in creating a "political space for himself as the only powerful figure who supported secularism and (…), minority rights" (Rubin, 1995: 275). Many former government officials and high cadres and leader, including Babrak Karmal one of the former presidents of Afghanistan, took up residence under his protection.

In august 1992 the UN moved main office in Afghanistan to Balkh and the neighbouring countries established their consulates there. Balkh became also the centre of expanding private trade and Dostum a regional power holder who started official trips to neighbouring countries (Uzbekistan, Turkey, Pakistan but also Saudi Arabia) where high-ranking government officials received him. Even though Dostum did verbally recognize the juridical sovereignty of Afghanistan, "The government in Kabul exercised no empirical sovereignty over his area" (Rubin, 1995: 275).

The Northeast

Most of the Northeast remained under the control of Supervisory Council of the North (SCN). According to both Rubin and Rasanayagam, the area was sufficiently institutionalized to function, while Massoud and Rabbani were in Kabul (Rasanayagam, 2005: 132-133; Rubin, 1995: 276). In contrast to Dostum, Masoud lacked any reliable foreign support. To gain foreign aid, Masoud allowed the exiled leadership of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan[9] to establish an office in the

---

[9] See Rubin (1995), p. 176.

capital of SCN, Takhar province. The only area that remained outside Masoud's control was part of Kunduz province populated by the Pashtun settlers who had returned their weapons to the Pashtun regional Amir Chughai, a member of Sayyaf's Itihad party.

The West

The Herat province, a major trade and cultural port, fell under the control of Amir Islamil Khan, who peacefully took control of the garrison and the Seventeenth Division. Ismail Khan succeeded in integrating the former military commanders into his council. He defeated the pro-Hekmatyar militia in the region. Herat under his rule, turned into a centre of economic revival. The economic growth enabled Ismail Khan to bring many more local commanders under his sway. Until 1993, despite the Iranian interference and pressure to bestow the Shi'a with more power, Herat remained stable and functioning.

The East

Besides the rival council of Kanar founded in 1988, the mujahedeen of the east established a new council in the Pashtun areas of Jalalabad and Gardez. Two political parties, Hizb-i-khalis and NIFA, dominated the region. Many wars between SCN and Hekmatyar supporter was fought in the region. The east became a cradle to foreign radicals that had no other place to operate. "Many radical Arab Islamists continued to train in Jalalabad" (Rubin, 1995: 277). The autonomy of both Hizb-i-Khalis and NIFA led to development of opium crop and its trade in the region.

The Hazarajat

The Shi'a in Afghanistan had never been this powerful before. Besides dominating certain parts of the Capital, they were fully autonomous in Hazarajat, central Afghanistan. They enjoyed the intellectual support of former governmental officials of Watan Party and were backed the Shi'a regime of Iran[10]. Ironically, despite their decade's old animosity with Pashtuns landlords and regimes, they built alliance with Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami in order to cope with the Uzbek and Tajik force and therefore, Dostum and Masoud alliance. But as with other alliances, within a few years every tie and alliance broke down and it became a war of all against all.

---

[10] See Rubin (1995), p. 278.

Scholars like Rasuly, Rasanayagam, Rubin and Farhang believe that state building in Afghanistan has always been based on foreign aid. When one pages through different chapters, histories seems to have repeated it over and over again.

The biggest obstacle Abdul Rahman and the Afghan modernist faced was lack of a proper economic system to modernize the army and the country. The communist regime of Najibullah too collapsed once foreign aid was stopped. Rubin (1995) and Rasanayagam (2005) too believe that one of the main reasons for the failure of the interim government to control Afghanistan, beside ethnical issues, was lack of a stable source of income. In the northeast for example, Masoud did not only oppose tax collection, he spent part of his foreign aid supporting farmers and small trade initiatives.

Briefly, given the geopolitical position of Afghanistan and lack of responsible leadership the Afghan state was destined to fail. In addition to that the disability of Afghan statesmen at the time to break the feudal and tribal structure of Afghanistan too contributed to this failure. But the main reason for the failure of the Afghan state has been the dependence of Afghan statesmen on the foreign aid. As discussed earlier during the British dominance in the region Afghanistan had a very weak economy and a very ill organized market. The Afghan state, for a great deal, was dependent on the British aid. Therefore, it never became a priority for the Afghan statesmen to develop a well-functioning taxation system to collect revenue. This legacy continues to be the faith of Afghan politics till now.

Besides these historical and structural factors, recent history of Afghanistan demonstrates how the deep-rooted ethnic conflict and cultural differences led to the fragmentation of the country. The structural exclusion of non-Afghan population, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other minorities, from political power and decision making, gave birth to devastating civil wars which badly damaged the sense of unity and social harmony. The struggle of non-Afghan population for recognition and equal politico-social rights has caused new challenges to both state building and nation building in Afghanistan.

Part 4: Analysis

The idea of a Federal Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was put forward by Taher Badakhshi, founder of *The Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Afghanistan* and published on their manifesto in 1973. He was the first to address the deeply

'feudal' and traditional structure of Afghanistan. As one of the founding fathers of left in Afghanistan, besides the back then much disputed class struggle he distinguished a form of national oppression, referring to the social, political and economic inequalities hunting Afghanistan. His argument was based on the structural exclusion of non-Pashtun from the decision-making processes and the Pashtun monopoly on the means of production and economic resources. To promote social and political equality and to advance economic development and fair division of resources between ethnic groups, *The Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Afghanistan* pleaded for a federal from of government with federations along ethnic lines. According to Taher Badakhshi, federalism was the only way out of the intensifying ethnic conflict and structural inequality.

Years after Taher Badakhshi, in the post-Taliban Afghanistan the question of the right form of government was raised again, this time the high rank US and EU officials who sought to bring about a long-lasting peace. One of those high rank officials was Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State proposing; "as we have studied the situation, the Afghan experience seems to show that when the government is roughly a loose federation, it seems to work, with a very high degree of local autonomy" (2001).

But ever since, federalism has been rejected by the ruling Pashtun elite. The main argument of the opponents of federalism in Afghanistan is that federalism is a recipe for the partition of Afghanistan. As one them puts it; "many who know the ground reality in Afghanistan would agree that federalism is not only unnecessary under the circumstances, but it also would serve as a recipe for deeper divisions among diverse ethnic groups in Afghanistan and would lead to a subsequent disintegration of the country" (Zakhilwal, 2001).

However opponents of federalism in Afghanistan have not managed to answer the question; why the a unitary system has failed to include all ethnic groups in governance of Afghanistan. In addition, as we saw in the second part of this paper, federalism has not only led to the disintegration of any country but has prevented them from such a break down. We have also seen that within the federal orders, political minorities are protected and individual liberties are preserved. Federalism has also been successful in managing ethnic and political conflict.

Conclusion

In order to answer the main question of this paper, another question must be asked; does Afghanistan meet the conditions for a federal system? As elaborated on the second part of this paper, many scholars agree that a federal arrangement of some kind will promote individual liberties, shelter and protect political minorities and stimulate cooperation to prevent conflict.

In case of Switzerland we have seen that the need for democratization, the will for mutual understanding among different lingual and communal minorities and a common economic interest has led the formation of the Swiss federal state. In case of India, the need for unity and domestic stability, fear of further disintegration after Pakistan's independence in 1947, the necessity to protect minorities and the urge to overcome the growing Hindu-Muslim anxiety led to formation Federal India. In Malaysia we have seen that ethnic and territorial diversity, communal interaction and desire to overcome Chinese economic dominance led to the expansion of Malaysian federation.

In other words, be it ethnic, territorial and lingual diversity, be it a long history of resentment and unresolved conflicts, be it the need for unity, stability and a long lasting peace, be it the necessity to prevent further intensification of ethnic conflict, be it the need for democratization and protection of minorities and politics of inclusion, be it the right to self-determination, Afghanistan as a lot in common with the three cases discussed. That is to say, the same condition and reasons apply for Afghanistan.

Coming to the main question of this paper, based what is so far elaborated, the opponent of federalism in Afghanistan have no solid ground to stand on. Federalism has nowhere led to disintegration or promotion of separatism. In contrast to what is argued, federalism has prevented many countries from dissolution along ethnic, lingual or religions lines. Therefore, this paper states that Afghanistan not only meets the conditions for federalism, that federalism might be the way out of ethnically diversified and divided Afghanistan. Only through federations and division of power embedded in a constitution that prevents both the local and the federal government from altering it unitarily. Furthermore, this paper humbly suggests a cultural federalism for Afghanistan. As the ethnic groups in Afghanistan are more bound by their cultural backgrounds than they ethnic descent.

Bibliography

❖ Barfield, T (2010) Afghanistan: A cultural and political history. Princeton University Press: New Jersey.

❖ Boal, F.W. (2001) 'Ethnic Conflicts', in N.J. Smelser (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Oxford: Elsevier Science.

❖ Burgess, Michael: Comparative Federalism, Theory and Practice, London etc. 2006.

❖ Burgess, Michael: Federalism and European Union – The building of Europe, 1950-2000, Routledge, London 2000

❖ Dosenrode, S. (2010) Federalism Theory and Neo-Functionalism: Elements for an analytical framework, *Perspectives on Federalism* 2(3).

❖ Duchacek, Ivo (1970) Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

❖ Dupree, N. H. (2002) Cultural heritage and national identity in Afghanistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 23(5): 997.

❖ Elazar, Daniel J. (1979a) 'Introduction: What is Federalism?', in D.J. Elazar (ed.), Federalism and Political Integration, Israel: Turtledove Publishing.

❖ Farhang, S. (1994) *Afghanistan in the last five centuries*. Pakistan: Daman Kitab.

❖ Goodin, Robert, 1996, Designing constitutions: the political constitution of a mixed commonwealth, *Political Studies*, 44: 635–46.

❖ Gregorian, V. (1969) The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

❖ Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, 1787–88, The Federalist Papers, Jacob E. Cooke (ed.), Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961.

❖ Hutchison, John and Anthony D. Smith (1996) 'Introduction', in J. Hutchison and A.D. Smith (eds), Ethnicity, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

❖ Hyman, A. (2002): Nationalism in Afghanistan. *Int. J. Middle East Stud*. 34 (2002), 299-315.

❖ Kalin, Walter (2000) 'Decentralized Governance in Fragmented Societies: Solution or Cause of New Evils?',in Facing Ethnic Conflicts, 14-16 December 2000. ZEF Bonn: Centre for Development Research.

❖ Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, 2001, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (3rd Edition), New York: Longman.

❖ King, Preston: Federalism and federation, Croom Helm, London 1982

❖ Kymlicka, Will (1995) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

❖ Kymlicka, Will (2001) Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

❖ Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild (1998a) 'Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict', in D.A. Lake and D. Rothchild (eds), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

❖ Lijphart, Arend (1991) 'The Power-sharing Approach', in J.V. Montville (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, New York: Lexington Books.

❖ McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary (1993) 'Introduction: The Macro-political Regulations of Conflict', in J. McGarry and B.O. Leary (eds), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts, London; New York: Routledge.

❖ Encyclopedia of Nations (2011). http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Afghanistan.html. (18-05-2011).

❖ Ostrom, Vincent (1979) 'Federal Principles of Organization and Ethnic Communities', in D.J. Elazar (ed.), Federalism and Political Integration, Israel: Turtledove Publishing.

❖ Rasanayagam, A. (2005) Afghanistan: A Modern History. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co.Ltd.

❖ Riker, William H.: Federalism – origin, operation, significance, Little, Brown and Company, Boston and Toronto, 1964.

❖ Rubin, B. (1995) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven CT: Yale University Press).

❖ Rubin, B. R. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. 2nd ed. New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

❖ Sharani, M. N. (2002) War, factionalism, and the state in Afghanistan.

American Anrhropologist, 104(3): 715.

❖ Smith, Anthony D. (1995a) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press.

❖ Smooha, Sammy (2002) 'Types of Democracy and Modes of Conflict Management in Ethnically Divided Societies', *Nations and Nationalism* 8(4).

❖ Spinelli, Altiero, and Ernesto Rossi, 1944, Il manifesto di Ventotene (The Ventotene Manifesto), Naples: Guida, 1982; reprinted in Karmis and Norman 2005

❖ Watts, Ronald (1999) Comparing Federal Systems, Second Edition, Montreal; Kingston; London; Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press.

❖ Wheare, K. C.: Federal Government, 4th edition, Oxford University Press, London, 1963

❖ Zakhilwal, O. (2001) Federalism in Afghanistan: A recipe for disintegration, *Federations*.